Most fraud cases that auditors write up follow a dull pattern. Someone sets up a supplier that doesn’t really exist, enters invoices for it, and makes sure the payments go out. None of it needs hacking. It only needs one person who is allowed to do all three steps. Segregation of duties is the control that makes that person impossible, or at least makes sure someone else is watching.
Segregation of duties (SoD), also called separation of duties, is the internal control principle that no single person should control every step of a sensitive process. Duties such as approving a transaction, recording it, handling the asset and reconciling the result are split between different people, so an error or a fraud by one person is likely to be caught by another.
In one sentence: Segregation of duties means splitting the key steps of a sensitive process between different people so that nobody can both commit and hide an error or fraud on their own.
Key takeaways
- The classic model separates four functions: authorization, recording, custody of assets and reconciliation.
- In business systems, SoD is mostly about access: which combinations of transactions one user may hold.
- “Create or change a vendor” plus “pay a vendor” is the textbook conflict in SAP and most ERP systems.
- Where full separation isn’t practical, companies use compensating (mitigating) controls such as independent review.
- Conflicts usually come from badly designed roles, so fix roles before chasing individual users.
Why does segregation of duties matter?
People make mistakes, and a few people commit fraud. A control system can’t stop either completely, but it can make sure a second person is in the path before damage is done. If the person who approves a payment is not the person who sets up the supplier, a fake supplier needs two people to agree, which is much rarer and much riskier for them.
SoD is also a requirement in practice. COSO’s Internal Control – Integrated Framework, which most US public companies use for Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) reporting, treats segregation of duties as part of selecting and developing control activities, and expects alternative controls where duties can’t be split. External auditors test it every year. In information security, NIST SP 800-53 includes a dedicated separation of duties control (AC-5) for the same reason.
Beyond fraud, SoD catches honest errors. A buyer who mistypes a price is likely to be caught when someone else receives the goods or matches the invoice. Splitting duties builds a natural review into the process.
What are the four duties that should be separated?
Accounting textbooks and audit guidance usually describe four functions. Holding two of them for the same transaction stream is what creates a conflict.
| Function | What it means | Example in purchasing |
|---|---|---|
| Authorization | Approving that a transaction may happen | Approving a purchase order or a payment |
| Recording | Entering the transaction in the books or system | Posting the supplier invoice |
| Custody | Control over the asset itself | Receiving the goods, controlling the bank account or payment file |
| Reconciliation | Checking that records match reality | Reconciling the bank statement or the supplier account |
A useful way to think about it: if one person could make something happen, record it in a way that looks normal and also control the check that would reveal it, the process has a hole.
What does SoD look like in an ERP system such as SAP?
In a small office, SoD is about who does which job. In an ERP system it’s mostly about access. Duties become transactions and authorizations, and a conflict exists when one user holds the access for two functions that should be split, whether or not they ever use it.
Here are conflicts that appear in almost every SAP rule set. Transaction codes vary by release and by company, so treat these as illustrations.
| Function A | Function B | What could go wrong |
|---|---|---|
| Maintain vendor master data (for example FK01, FK02 or the business partner transaction BP) | Process vendor payments (for example the payment run F110) | Create a fake supplier or change a real supplier’s bank details, then pay it |
| Maintain vendor master data | Post vendor invoices | Enter invoices for a fictitious supplier that then go out in the normal payment run |
| Create purchase orders (ME21N) | Post goods receipts (MIGO) | Order goods and confirm receipt of goods that never arrived |
| Create purchase orders | Approve (release) purchase orders | Approve your own purchases |
| Post journal entries | Approve journal entries | Hide a misstatement in the general ledger |
| Create users | Assign roles | Give yourself or a friend any access in the system |
The last row is easy to forget. Security administration has its own SoD. If one administrator can create a user and also assign it powerful roles, every other control in the system depends on that one person’s honesty.
A conflict is defined at the level of access, not activity. Auditors care that a user could perform both steps, because a control that depends on people choosing not to misuse access isn’t much of a control. Many companies also check actual usage, which tells you which conflicts are real working needs and which roles carry access nobody uses.
A worked example: the vendor bank change
Picture an accounts payable team of four. One clerk, Sam, handles supplier set-up and also runs the weekly payment run because the team is small. Sam gets an email that looks like it’s from a real supplier: “We’ve changed banks, please update our details.” Sam updates the bank account and the next payment run sends the supplier’s money to the new account. The supplier calls two weeks later asking where its payment is.
Nobody in that story needs to be dishonest. The email was a scam, and Sam did what it asked. With SoD in place the path looks different. Sam can change the bank details, but a second person must confirm the change, ideally after calling the supplier on a number already on file. Until then the vendor is excluded from payment. And Sam can’t run the payment anyway, so a colleague reviewing the run would see a recently changed bank account on the list. The same split that stops an insider also gives you two chances to catch an outside scam.
How do companies find SoD conflicts?
There are three common approaches, and most mature companies end up with the third.
- Manual review. Export users and roles to spreadsheets and compare them against a conflict matrix. This works for a handful of users. It doesn’t scale, it goes out of date fast, and it rarely looks deep enough to catch authorization-level conflicts.
- Built-in reports. ERP systems have reports that show who can run which transactions. They help with spot checks but don’t apply a full rule set automatically.
- Rule-based tools. Products such as SAP GRC Access Control or SAP Cloud Identity Access Governance hold a rule set of risks, each made of functions mapped down to transactions and authorization objects. They analyze roles and users, simulate the effect of a change and stop new conflicts during access requests.
Whatever the tool, the rule set decides the quality of the result. A rule set copied without tailoring produces long lists of false positives that nobody trusts. A good one is agreed with the business process owners, covers the company’s custom transactions, and is reviewed when processes change.
What if you can’t fully separate duties?
Small teams can’t always split every step. A subsidiary with three finance people may simply not have enough staff. In those cases the accepted answer is a compensating control, often called a mitigating control: an extra check that would catch a problem the conflict could cause.
Some common examples:
- Independent review of changes. Someone outside the process reviews every change to vendor bank details before the next payment run. In SAP, the vendor master change log (for example transaction FK04) supports this.
- Dual control on sensitive fields. SAP can require a second person to confirm changes to sensitive vendor fields such as bank details. Until the change is confirmed, the vendor is blocked from the payment run.
- Exception reports. A report of payments to vendors created or changed in the last 30 days, reviewed by a manager.
- Independent reconciliations. Bank and supplier reconciliations done by someone who can’t post invoices or payments.
- Time-limited access. Emergency or “firefighter” access that is granted for a few hours, logged and reviewed afterward, instead of permanent access.
A mitigating control only counts if it is actually performed and evidenced. Auditors will ask for the signed-off review for a sample of months. A control documented in GRC that nobody performs is a finding waiting to happen.
How do you fix SoD conflicts?
The first full analysis of a large SAP system often shows thousands of user-level conflicts. That number looks scary, but most of them come from a few roles. A practical order of work:
- Clean the rule set first. Remove risks that don’t apply, add your custom transactions and agree the list with the business. Fixing the wrong conflicts wastes months.
- Fix conflicts inside single roles. If one role contains both vendor maintenance and payment, every user with that role has the conflict. Split the role and the user count drops.
- Remove unused access. Usage data often shows that users never run half the transactions in their roles. Removing unused access is the quickest win and rarely meets resistance.
- Decide on the rest with the business. For each remaining user conflict, either remove access or accept the risk with a named mitigating control and owner.
- Prevent new conflicts. Run a risk check on every access request and every role change, so the clean state doesn’t decay.
- Review regularly. Periodic user access reviews and rule set reviews keep the program honest.
The common mistake is to start with users. Cleaning users one at a time while the roles stay broken is endless work, because every new person who gets the same role brings the conflict back.
SoD beyond finance: IT and security
Segregation of duties isn’t only an accounting idea. In IT the same logic applies to change management. The developer who writes a change shouldn’t be the person who moves it into production without review. The administrator who can change security settings shouldn’t be the only one who reviews the security logs. Cloud platforms raise the same question for people who can both change infrastructure and switch off the monitoring that would show the change.
It also connects to modern security models such as zero trust, which rely on least privilege: give each person only the access they need. SoD adds a second question on top: even if each permission is justified on its own, is the combination dangerous?
Frequently asked questions
What is a segregation of duties conflict?
A conflict exists when one person holds access or responsibility for two functions that should be split, such as maintaining supplier records and paying suppliers. The conflict exists even if the person never misuses it.
Is segregation of duties required by law?
Laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require public companies to maintain effective internal control over financial reporting. They don’t list specific SoD rules, but auditors treat segregation of duties as a basic part of effective control and test it.
What is a mitigating control?
A mitigating control, also called a compensating control, is an extra check that reduces the risk of a conflict you’ve decided to accept. Examples include an independent review of vendor bank changes before each payment run or a manager’s review of an exception report.
How often should SoD be reviewed?
Access should be checked for conflicts on every request, and many companies run full SoD analyses and user access reviews quarterly or semi-annually. The rule set itself should be reviewed when business processes or systems change.
The bottom line
Segregation of duties splits approval, recording, custody and reconciliation so one person can’t both cause and hide a problem. In ERP systems like SAP it becomes an access question, best handled with a tailored rule set, clean roles and a risk check on every access request. Where you can’t separate duties, use a mitigating control that someone actually performs and can prove. If you’re starting out, read our guides to SAP and SAP GRC next.
Sources: McGill Internal Audit summary of the COSO Internal Control framework; NIST SP 800-53, control AC-5 Separation of Duties; SAPinsider: dual control for sensitive vendor fields.


