Most SAP fraud cases and many SAP breaches don’t need a hacker. They need one user with one authorization too many: a payables clerk who can also change supplier bank details, a support analyst who can debug and change values in production, a contractor who still has an account three months after leaving. Authorization risk is the quiet part of SAP security, and it’s where auditors find the most issues.
SAP authorization risks are the ways a user’s access can be misused, whether on purpose or by accident. They fall into four groups: critical access that is dangerous on its own, segregation of duties conflicts, access that has outlived its purpose, and technical users nobody watches. Each group has specific authorization objects, reports and controls you can check.
In one sentence: SAP authorization risk is any access that lets someone do more than their job needs, from SAP_ALL and debug-with-change to quiet SoD conflicts and forgotten technical users.
Key takeaways
- A handful of authorizations, such as
SAP_ALLand debugging with change, can bypass almost every other control. - Segregation of duties conflicts let one person complete a fraud alone.
- Access grows over time unless reviews and leaver processes remove it.
- RFC and other technical users often hold broad access with little monitoring.
RSUSR002in SUIM answers “who can do this?” directly from the system.
Which SAP authorizations are the most dangerous?
Some access is risky no matter who holds it, because it lets the holder get around the controls that protect everything else.
| Access | Typical authorizations | Why it’s dangerous |
|---|---|---|
| Superuser profiles | SAP_ALL, SAP_NEW |
Nearly unrestricted access to the system |
| Debugging with change | S_DEVELOP with object type DEBUG and change activity |
Lets a user alter values in a running program and skip authorization checks |
| User and role administration | S_USER_GRP, S_USER_AGR, S_USER_PRO |
The holder can create users or grant any access, including to themselves |
| Table maintenance | S_TABU_DIS, S_TABU_NAM with change |
Direct changes to data or configuration without application checks |
| Development and transport | S_DEVELOP with change, S_TRANSPRT |
Change programs or move changes into production |
| Program execution | Broad S_PROGRAM and report start access |
Run reports and utilities that were never meant for the user |
SAP_NEW exists to bridge authorization gaps during upgrades. It shouldn’t stay assigned once the upgrade is done. SAP_ALL belongs only in tightly controlled emergency access.
What are segregation of duties risks in SAP?
A segregation of duties (SoD) conflict exists when one person holds two functions that should be split, so they could complete a fraud or a serious error alone. Common SAP examples:
- maintain supplier master data, including bank details, and run the payment program;
- create a purchase order and release it;
- post goods receipts and enter supplier invoices for the same purchases;
- maintain employee master data and run payroll;
- create users and assign roles.
SoD risk is managed with a rule set and regular analysis, usually in SAP Access Control or a similar tool. Where a conflict can’t be removed, a documented mitigating control reduces the risk, such as an independent review of bank detail changes before each payment run.
How does access creep become a risk?
Access tends to grow. People change jobs and keep their old roles. Projects end and project access stays. Temporary fixes become permanent. Three processes keep it in check:
- Leavers. Compare the HR leaver list with SAP users and check that accounts were locked on time and not used afterwards.
- Movers. When someone changes jobs, remove the old access as well as adding the new.
- Periodic reviews. Managers or role owners confirm access is still needed, using role descriptions they can understand. A manager who approves 2,000 lines in ten minutes isn’t reviewing.
Why are technical and RFC users a risk?
System and communication users connect interfaces, batch jobs and other systems. They often hold broad authorizations because “the interface failed once” and nobody narrowed them afterwards. Look for:
- RFC destinations in production with stored credentials of powerful users, which let anyone who can use the destination act as that user;
- broad
S_RFCauthorizations, such as access to every function group; - trusted RFC relationships that allow logon without a password;
- technical users of type dialog, which allows interactive logon they don’t need.
Separate these users into their own user groups with S_USER_GRP, so service desk staff who reset business passwords can’t change powerful accounts.
What about privacy and data access risks?
Authorization risk isn’t only about fraud. Broad display access to HR, customer or bank data creates privacy risk under laws such as the GDPR, because each person who can see personal data needs a purpose. Display access to infotypes, customer master data or bank tables deserves the same scrutiny as change access when the data is personal. Read access logging and field masking can add detective controls for the most sensitive fields.
How do you find authorization risks in your system?
- Ask the system who can do it.
RSUSR002, the SUIM report for users by complex selection criteria, finds users with a given combination of authorization values. It answers questions like “who can change supplier bank details in company code 1000?”. - Analyze at permission level. Transaction codes alone overstate and understate risk; authorization values tell the truth.
- Include Fiori. In S/4HANA, check OData services and the business objects behind them as well as transactions.
- Check the Security Audit Log. Look at what powerful users actually did, not only what they could do.
- Start with the riskiest groups. List every user with
SAP_ALLand debug-with-change in production first; that list is usually shorter and more alarming than expected.
Frequently asked questions
What is a critical authorization in SAP?
A critical authorization is access that is risky on its own, such as SAP_ALL, debugging with change, user administration or direct table maintenance. It needs strict limits whoever holds it.
How do I find who has a specific authorization in SAP?
Use the SUIM report RSUSR002, users by complex selection criteria. Enter the authorization object and values you care about, and it lists the users who hold them.
Why is debug with change dangerous in production?
It lets a user change values in a running program, which can skip authorization checks and alter data directly. It should only be available through logged and reviewed emergency access.
Should SAP_NEW be assigned to users?
No, not permanently. SAP_NEW covers authorizations introduced in new releases during upgrades and should be removed once roles have been updated.
The bottom line
Authorization risk in SAP comes down to a short list: critical access, SoD conflicts, access that outlives its purpose, technical users and broad access to personal data. Find them with permission-level analysis and RSUSR002, fix roles before adding mitigations, and keep leaver and review processes honest. Start with the basics of SAP roles and segregation of duties.
Sources: SAP Help: Authorization checks in ABAP programs; SAP Learning: Authorization concept for SAP S/4HANA; NIST SP 800-53, control AC-6 Least Privilege.


